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Mediating Incentive Use:  
A Time-Series Assessment of Economic Development Deals in North Carolina 
1. INTRODUCTION 
As state governments throughout the United States face unprecedented fiscal crises, every 
public program—from education to pensions to prisons—has come under intense scrutiny and is 
a potential target for budget cuts. But even as the pressure to reduce state spending has increased, 
the need for job creation has intensified, as unemployment remains stubbornly high in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession. Thus, economic development practitioners who are charged 
with bringing new employment opportunities to their communities face a sharp tension. On the 
one hand, there is pressure to use their most common and most tangible tool—direct tax 
incentive payments—when negotiating with mobile businesses to “win” jobs for local residents. 
Simultaneously, critics of economic development incentives claim that such payments are 
unnecessary giveaways to the private sector and should not be used while basic services such as 
education and health care are being cut.   
To further complicate the issue, many scholars argue that using direct incentives is 
antithetical to a more strategic approach to economic development that entails public funding for 
industry-wide support systems such as key infrastructure projects, research and development 
facilities, technology centers, or state-of-the-art workforce development systems. Although the 
theoretical and empirical literature on economic development incentives is rich (Bartik 2005; 
Greenstone and Moretti 2003; also see, for example, Markusen 2007; Persky, Felsenstein, and 
Wiewel 1997; Peters and Fisher 2004), this paper engages the incentive debate in a novel way. 
Specifically, we conduct a quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of state incentives in 
creating sustained employment opportunities. However, we present this analysis of incentive use 
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within the context of existing state-level economic development practices that have developed in 
our case state of North Carolina over the past several decades.  
North Carolina has a long track record of public-private partnerships and state-led efforts 
to promote economic development through common-pool industry resources. Early examples of 
this include the development of the Research Triangle Park (RTP) and a relatively strong 
commitment to higher education; more recently, there have been experiments in regional and 
sectoral initiatives in the 1980s and 1990s. Incentive use in North Carolina is even more recent: 
North Carolina initiated its first statewide statutory tax incentive program in 1996—the William 
S. Lee Tax Credit Program—and only began its two major discretionary incentive programs in 
2000 (One North Carolina Fund) and 2003 (Job Development Investment Grants [JDIG]).   
Given the state’s recent adoption of incentives and its unique policy history, North 
Carolina is an ideal setting in which to test the effectiveness of incentives in creating and 
sustaining job opportunities in the long run. Instead of comparing incentive use to a fictional, 
counterfactual reality where no incentives are given, this paper explores the question of whether 
economic development incentives are more effective when they are used as inducements to 
industry, or whether they are better used to support sector-wide functions of long-range strategic 
planning.  
This paper employs a quasi-experimental research design to measure the impact of 
incentive granting on employment growth at the establishment level, using a data set of nearly all 
state-level incentives granted between 1996 and 2008. Incentivized establishments are matched 
to the National Establishment Time-Series Database (NETS) for North Carolina, which contains 
longitudinal information on employment as well as the highly detailed establishment 
characteristics needed to construct a set of realistic control groups. We measure the impact of 
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retention incentives using an interrupted time-series research design that compares pre- and post-
trends in employment at “treated” establishments to a set of control establishments selected by 
peer industry establishment size.  
Specifically, this analysis compares “deals” made in industries that are the focus of 
traditional long-term economic development planning activities such as state-funded research 
centers, workforce development initiatives, and joint industry-state planning agencies, to those 
deals that occur in other sectors. We employ the term “mediated industries” to distinguish these 
sectors from others that lack more coordinated development activities. Thus, the main research 
questions posed address not only the straightforward policy question of “Do economic 
development incentives induce growth?” but also the more specific question of “In which 
context are incentives more likely to induce growth?” In addition, we make a similar set of 
comparisons for incentives that flow to firms recruited from outside of North Carolina.  Since we 
lack pre-incentive employment observations for this set of incentives, we employ a modified 
research design that builds a control group using a nearest-neighbor matching technique based on 
each establishment’s unique characteristics, including birth year, industry, mobility, and 
ownership structure.  
Ultimately, we find that both the retention and recruitment incentives offered by the state 
of North Carolina positively influence future employment growth at the establishment level. 
However, the positive impacts are concentrated in sectors that are directly or indirectly 
connected to sector-specific planning efforts. These findings have significant implications for 
both policymakers and theory. First, we interpret the empirical results as evidence of the 
effectiveness of state-level industry mediation in general, which implies that state funding for 
long-range strategic and sector-based planning efforts should be maintained and even expanded. 
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Second, this analysis indicates that incentives are efficient when used in the context of broader 
supports for economic development—including support for common pool resources across key 
industries—and should not be viewed by theorists as strictly antithetical to sound economic 
development practice.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section Two lays out the policy 
background of incentive use in North Carolina and presents our theory of how state actors 
engage in “mediating” incentives within certain targeted industries. This section also summarizes 
previous empirical analysis of the impact of incentives on employment. Section Three describes 
the data sources used and the assumptions made in constructing our matched panel data set from 
NETS and presents summary statistics that describe incentive use in North Carolina over the 
study period. Section Four presents two distinct methodologies for detecting employment 
impacts in both retained and recruited firms in North Carolina. Section Five presents the main 
empirical findings and discusses the robustness of these findings. Section Six concludes and 
presents our interpretation for policymakers and theory. 
2. BACKGROUND AND LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 State Economic Development Strategy and the Evolving Use of Incentives 
After a long period of reluctance on the part of lawmakers, North Carolina is now a 
significant player in the incentive game nationally. The North Carolina General Assembly took 
initial steps to authorize incentive use for economic development in the early 1990s. The 
legislature created the Governor’s Industrial Recruitment Competitiveness Fund in 1993 to 
provide matching funds to local governments to expand the capacity of local incentive granting. 
Then, in 1996, the North Carolina Supreme Court ruled in Malready v. The City of Winston-
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Salem that tax credits and cash grants were constitutionally permissible when used for economic 
development by both state and local governments.  
North Carolina initiated its first statewide statutory tax incentive program in 1996 under 
the William S. Lee program. As first enacted, the William S. Lee Act provided a series of 
entitlement incentives—tax credits for any firm choosing to locate, create jobs, and provide 
investment in North Carolina. In order to promote investment outside of the state’s wealthier 
urban counties, the statute directed larger credit amounts for those firms locating in more 
economically distressed counties, designated by five tiers, ranging from the most distressed (Tier 
1) to least distressed (Tier 5).1  Additionally, the state attached strict performance criteria and 
clawback mechanisms to these credits in order to ensure that firms lived up to their promised job 
creation targets in exchange for the public subsidy. Ultimately, the Lee Act was repealed and 
replaced by a series of new entitlement tax credits (most notably, Article 3J credits for job 
creation).  
As mentioned in the first section, North Carolina also has two major discretionary 
incentive programs, including the OneNC Fund (the renamed and expanded Governor’s 
Industrial Recruitment Competitiveness Fund) and the Jobs Development Investment Grant, or 
JDIG, program, created in 2002). In its current form, the OneNC Fund provides matching grants 
to local governments to increase the amount of incentives that local governments can offer for 
retention, expansion, and recruitment deals. Although any unit of government across the state 
may apply for OneNC funds, the program’s matching structure is intended specifically to benefit 
the most distressed counties, which would otherwise have less fiscal capacity to offer 
competitive incentives. Unless paired with a JDIG grant, OneNC funds are normally disbursed in 
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four equal tranches over a three-year period, subject to strict job creation accountability 
provisions (North Carolina Department of Commerce 2012).  
JDIG, the state’s flagship program, is a performance-based incentive program that 
provides annual grant distributions to a maximum of 25 qualifying firms per year for a period of 
up to 12 years for the purpose of supporting retention, expansion, and recruitment. Unlike the 
OneNC Fund, the JDIG provides cash grants directly to the recipient firms, based on a 
percentage of the withholding taxes paid by new employees during each calendar year. In effect, 
the program avoids the constitutional limitations on tax incentives by providing cash assistance 
equal to the value of the taxes paid by employees, thus tying the grant obligation to the firm’s 
performance in job creation. JDIG grants possess strong wage requirements, performance 
criteria, and clawback mechanisms, which the state has not hesitated to employ in the 14 cases 
(as of 2012) in which a firm has failed to meet to its job creation targets. Given the 12-year 
disbursement period, none of the grants have been fully disbursed to recipient firms, so total job 
creation and investment totals are currently incomplete.  
Beyond the state-level programs, many local governments in North Carolina offer their 
own incentives, usually in the form of cash grants or constitutionally appropriate tax breaks, but 
little is known about their scope, scale, or effectiveness. To remedy this knowledge gap, the 
General Assembly passed legislation in 2011 requiring the Department of Commerce to track 
and report local incentive activity on a quarterly basis. 
2.2 North Carolina’s Incentive Use in a Theoretical Context: Explaining Mediation 
While industrial recruitment has a long history in North Carolina, as the above section 
suggests, the use of incentives to attract and recruit individual firms is a fairly recent practice, 
especially when compared to other Southern states that have been in the incentive-granting game 
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since the 1930s. Prior to the 1990s, North Carolina chose instead to give priority to investments 
in institutions and infrastructure that could make the state an attractive location for business 
development, be that locally driven or through recruitment efforts involving outside 
establishments. As early as the 1920s, North Carolina state government invested heavily in 
transportation infrastructure, paving more miles through state funding than virtually any other 
state in the nation and earning the moniker “The Good Roads State.” In 1959, North Carolina 
created the Research Triangle Park with the goal of increasing good-quality employment 
opportunities for graduates of the region’s preeminent universities (Link 1995; Rohe 2011). In 
the 1960s, North Carolina established one of the nation’s first state-level science and technology 
advisory boards, whose primary mission was to advise the governor on science and technology 
policy across the state (Feldman and Lowe 2011).  
Under Gov. Jim Hunt, the North Carolina Board of Science and Technology 
recommended the formation of several high-profile economic development and educational 
institutions, including the Microelectronics Center of North Carolina and the North Carolina 
School of Science and Mathematics.  During that time, the Board also established and managed 
the North Carolina Biotechnology Center, the nation’s first state-funded economic development 
organization to support life-sciences industry development, eventually spinning it out as a quasi-
public institution (Feldman and Lowe 2011). In the 1990s, regional coordination of economic 
development was institutionalized by the state legislature through the creation of seven regional 
partnerships designed to align local development priorities and resources. In addition to these 
developments, North Carolina has built an impressive community college system that is 
considered to be one of the more inclusive and better functioning in the nation (Osterman and 
Batt 1993). 
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Broadly speaking, each of these initiatives has contributed to common-pool resources for 
promoting and supporting industrial development in North Carolina. With this contribution in 
mind, scholars and analysts alike are often quick to dismiss North Carolina’s more recent foray 
into incentive granting as a step backwards and as antithetical to this earlier, more progressive 
policy tradition. Many analysts lament the recent policy shift towards incentive granting, 
claiming that it even undermines the strategic work of earlier generations. At times, this 
impression is reinforced through media accounts of incentivized recruitment and retention deals 
in which public officials make apologetic statements about their reliance on incentives to attract 
or retain industry. These statements reflect a common narrative that North Carolina was forced to 
lower its economic development standards after losing several high profile recruitment deals to 
neighboring states that offered sizable incentive packages.  
Although there is likely some truth to this “race to the bottom” characterization, it also 
overlooks important elements in the evolution of economic development policy in this state. 
First, the conventional narrative gives the false impression that North Carolina, in limiting earlier 
incentive use, had also avoided recruitment and retention strategies altogether. On the contrary, 
retention and recruitment have long played a role in economic development in the state; a recent 
biography of Governor Hunt—a much-praised, four-term governor who was instrumental in 
strategic planning efforts—acknowledges that he dedicated considerable time while in office to 
marketing the state to outside industrial prospects (Grimsley 2003). Second, the conventional 
account discounts the fact that the emergence of incentive-granting processes is grounded in the 
state’s well-established institutional infrastructure, which earlier forms of strategic planning 
helped to create. These interconnections help to establish standards within the incentive-granting 
process itself and, more importantly, contribute to structures for mediating the relationship 
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between incentive use and development outcomes over time. As this suggests, there are spheres 
in which new and old policy efforts intersect and even complement one another. By recognizing 
this, we can turn our focus to areas of overlapping strategy and consider the implications this 
may have for long-term development planning.  
In this paper, we analyze two types of interactions between incentive-granting and 
established strategic planning efforts. The first interaction is information-intensive, reflecting the 
use of analytical tools and techniques by local and regional economic development practitioners 
and analysts in an effort to better guide and evaluate incentive-granting processes. In North 
Carolina, as elsewhere, this is primarily achieved through industry or sector targeting—that is 
to say, concentrating economic development efforts in industries that demonstrate high growth 
potential for the region. Industrial or sector targets are typically generated through rigorous 
statistical analyses, which take into account the industrial legacies and characteristics of the 
regional economy (Bartik 2005). This can include the use of growth models that factor in 
existing supply chains, workforce skill specializations, and export performance. In some cases, 
analyses also include inventories of regional support institutions designed to nurture and support 
targeted industry (Cox et al. 2009). Targeting efforts can be beneficial for channeling public 
resources to entrepreneurial development (Woodward and Guimarães 2009). However, they are 
most commonly associated with strategies of industrial recruitment and retention and, by default, 
the application of incentives (Goetz, Deller, and Harris 2009). 
In the North Carolina context, industry targeting has been especially visible at the 
multicounty regional level. Although state development agencies frequently acknowledge 
industries of interest for the entire state, the tendency is to decentralize explicit targeting efforts 
to the regional level, given North Carolina’s diverse industrial landscape and regionally varied 
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economic strengths. Still, state agencies actively support regional targeting efforts. As one 
illustration, North Carolina’s Department of Commerce in 2001 provided each of the state’s 
seven regional partnerships with funding to conduct in-depth economic analyses of their regions, 
in an effort to identify existing and emergent industrial strengths. The goal of this exercise was to 
encourage regions to channel state and local resources to activities that supported targeted 
industry development and revitalization, including, but not limited to, firm recruitment and 
retention.  
The second relationship between incentive granting and strategic planning that we 
explore involves institutional mediation. By institutional mediation we mean active 
involvement by sector-oriented institutions in mediating and governing incentive-backed 
recruitment and retention activities. As this implies, mediation efforts are closely linked to 
targeting strategies, insofar as the mediating institutions also have a sector or industry focus. But 
institutional mediation goes beyond efforts to simply inventory or catalog industry-support 
institutions. Rather, mediation implies active engagement by those same institutions in planning 
processes designed to guide and moderate sector-specific recruitment and retention efforts. This 
includes playing an active role in establishing and maintaining strong relationships with firms 
before, during, and after the recruitment or retention deal-making period. In the case of firm 
recruitment, institutional engagement also means developing relationships with industrial 
prospects well before there is a need for a new facility and structuring those early conversations 
in ways that shape later perception of or interest in North Carolina.  
Other mediation activities include tracking and responding to ongoing and emergent 
sector challenges and constraints—an information-gathering and assessment task that is itself 
dependent on the maintenance of close relationships with networks of firms within the sector. 
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Additionally, institutional mediation entails coordination of economic development planning 
across multiple levels of decision making and across distinct areas of development strategy. By 
this we mean that mediating institutions ensure that recruitment and retention activities are not 
performed in isolation, but rather are shepherded in a way that ratchets up standards for how 
incentive-backed deals get made, regardless of whether the locus of deal-making is at the local, 
regional, or state level. However, to an equal extent, mediated institutional support entails 
stitching together and aligning recruitment, retention, and even entrepreneurial efforts, and doing 
so in ways that motivate the development of a cohesive policy “portfolio.” 
Although this may sound ambitious and perhaps even impossible to implement, it is 
important to recognize that North Carolina has already embraced institutional mediation and has 
experienced success, as illustrated in the biomanufacturing sector (Lowe, forthcoming). In-depth 
case study analysis points to a central mediating role of North Carolina’s Biotechnology Center, 
an institution long associated with North Carolina’s strategic planning efforts. Since its creation 
in 1981, the Biotech Center has supported research and development activities through a variety 
of grant, loan, and industry networking initiatives. Over the decades, the center has also assisted 
in the recruitment of preeminent scholars in an effort to further enhance university research—an 
early example being Prof. Oliver Smithies, who went on to win a Nobel Prize in physiology in 
2007. In addition to these successes, the Biotech Center has formalized its role in industrial 
recruitment and retention, establishing itself as a leading institution for strategy development. 
Furthermore, the center approaches this task in partnership with North Carolina’s Department of 
Commerce and the state’s community college system, with each entity playing a unique but 
complementary role in strategy development and implementation.  
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By mediating recruitment and retention efforts, the Biotech Center, with the help of these 
core institutional partners, has been able to better anticipate and thus prepare for recruitment 
opportunities. In addition, it is in a position to identify and resolve emergent industry challenges 
that have the potential to affect firm retention over time. In considering both recruitment 
opportunities and retention challenges, the Biotech Center has concentrated on improving 
industry support institutions, especially in the area of technical training and education. In 
partnership with the community college system, the Biotech Center has enhanced the quality of 
manufacturing establishments recruited to the state and motivated firms that locate in North 
Carolina to experiment with innovations in life science manufacturing. By working closely with 
the Department of Commerce, the Biotech Center also ensures strong coordination between state 
and local economic development planning efforts; such coordination includes empowering local 
practitioners to uphold industry recruitment standards based on job-quality concerns and 
evidence of a strong fit between an industrial prospect and the practitioners’ community. 
Ultimately, the mediated approach taken by the Biotech Center and its partners encourages 
sustained manufacturing job growth and promotes regional advantages that ultimately reinforce 
industry stickiness and staying power.   
Drawing inspiration from biomanufacturing, experiments in institutional intermediation 
are underway in other sectors and industries in North Carolina, most notably in advanced 
textiles, including nonwovens and—more recently—aerospace. This presents an opportunity to 
systematically examine the impact of institutional mediation on incentive-backed recruitment 
and retention. Before turning to this analysis, it is useful to first situate our work in relation to 
other quantitative studies in this area.  
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2.3 Previous Empirical Analysis of Incentive Impacts 
 The literature on the economic impact of state economic development incentive use is 
extensive but remains unsettled in terms of the overall assessment of incentives; this 
ambivalence is mirrored by the ongoing controversy over incentives in practice. From the 
standpoint of an ideal research design, analysts and policymakers would wish to answer the so-
called “but for” question with regard to incentives (i.e., But for the incentive, would the firm 
have come or have been retained?). In fact, most careful cost-benefit analyses of incentives hinge 
on this very question. However, it is nearly impossible to answer this question absolutely given 
that the analyst cannot know the exact nature of each firm’s location decision a priori and that 
firms are never randomly assigned an incentive, which makes it difficult to generate coherent 
control groups.  
Despite these challenges there have been many attempts to evaluate incentives indirectly.  
For example, some researchers have focused on state- or county-level aggregate outcomes such 
as employment growth and changes in tax revenue, comparing areas that spend more or less on 
development incentives. Goss and Phillps (1997) show that state spending on economic 
development incentives is positively associated with employment growth across the United 
States, and Loh (1993) finds that Ohio’s incentive grants in the 1980s made a positive impact on 
county-level employment and income growth. In a detailed analysis of highly competitive 
economic development deals in the United States, Greenstone and Moretti (2003) overcome the 
problem of endogeneity between the intensity of public incentive-granting and employment by 
comparing county-level outcomes for communities that won a “million-dollar plant” to those of 
counties that bid for but did not complete the deal. They find that total earnings grew 1.5 percent 
faster for incentivized industries in winning counties than for such industries in those counties 
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that lost the plant. However, a more recent analysis of Michigan’s MEGA tax incentive program 
(Hicks and LaFaive 2011) found no statistically significant impact on county-level income, 
employment, unemployment rate, or wages.  
 Although the majority of research has focused on impacts at an aggregate areal level—
largely because of limitations in obtaining establishment-level outcomes—some papers have 
attempted to measure the impact of incentives at the firm or establishment level.  For example, 
Faulk (2002) uses firm-level data from corporate tax returns to estimate the employment impact 
of Georgia’s Jobs Tax Credit program from 1993–1995. This study compared employment 
change in eligible firms that participated in tax credit programs to employment change in eligible 
firms that did not participate in tax credit programs and found that firms taking advantage of the 
tax credit created 23–28 percent more jobs.   
However, these incentives are not discretionary, in the sense that offers are made by 
public officials to a single firm, so it could be that firms that were planning to add jobs in the 
future were simply more likely to participate in the program. Similarly, Gabe and Kraybill 
(2002) analyzed the impact of incentives on 366 manufacturing establishments that expanded 
during the 1980s and showed that incentives actually had a negative impact on subsequent 
employment change. However, since their data set of both incentivized and nonincentivized 
observations was drawn only from establishments that were already expanding, their results may 
be biased downward. This is because their control group did not include firms in similar 
industries that did not expand locally but either left the region to expand elsewhere or would 
have added jobs if they had received an incentive.  
Overall, while most quantitative assessments of incentives focus on county- or state-level 
impacts, those papers that do focus on the firm or establishment level often fail to construct an 
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appropriate control group of nonincentivized firms to generate valid estimates. These highly 
quantitative assessments tend to focus on one form of economic development policy—
incentives—in isolation and make no attempt to understand the potentially critical interaction 
between recruitment or retention policy and other long-range strategic planning efforts. This 
paper advances the empirical literature on incentives in two ways. First, we conduct our analysis 
at the establishment level using time-series data for (nearly) all establishments in North Carolina 
that allow for the construction of a reasonable set of controls. Second, by comparing the impact 
of incentives in sectors of the economy that are the focus of state-led planning efforts, we can 
provide empirical evidence of the effectiveness of such planning efforts in a general sense. This 
is particularly interesting since it is often difficult for policymakers to demonstrate the 
effectiveness of broad-based institutional supports for economic development. Therefore the 
research design proposed below will allow us to make an estimate not only as to the impact of 
incentives on employment growth, but also as to  the broader impact of industry mediation in the 
process of economic development.   
3. DATA SOURCES  
3.1 Database Construction Steps 
As we said above, a key aspect that distinguishes this paper from previous quantitative 
analyses is the focus on employment effects at the establishment level using quasi-experimental 
methods that isolate the causal impact of the incentive itself on future job growth. To conduct 
this analysis we use two major sources to build a time-series database of observations for those 
establishments that received an economic development incentive and a time-series database for 
those that did not—our two control groups.  First, we use data on incentive grants obtained from 
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a comprehensive media study of announced deals generated by the University of North 
Carolina’s Kenan Institute. This database was constructed by searching all major newspapers in 
the state for announced incentive deals from 1996 to 2006. This data set contains information on 
incentives that involved discretionary funding from the state—primarily from the OneNC and 
JDIG programs—but does not include grants made exclusively by local government.2 The media 
survey contained 387 total incentives during the study period, consisting of 173 retention grants 
and 214 recruitments. This database also recorded the date of announcement, the total incentive 
amount (state and local match), the expected number of jobs created, and the county in which the 
project occurred. To ensure that the media survey covered the full extent of state incentive 
grants, we compared the database to annual reports from the North Carolina Department of 
Commerce covering the name of establishment, incentive amount, and promised and actual job 
creations.3 These combined sources were used to define the set of “treated” establishments and 
the key variables of interest—the timing of the incentive (year) as well as whether the incentive 
was a retention or recruitment deal.  
Next, we matched our treatment set of incentive establishments to the National 
Establishment Time Series (NETS) database. The NETS has the distinct advantage of offering a 
consistent time-series of observations on employment between 1990 and 2008; this series 
provides a host of establishment characteristics on which we rely to construct a set of control 
samples of similar, nonincentivized businesses.  Although the NETS database is used with 
increasing frequency in academic research (Lester 2011; Neumark, Zhang, and Wall 2005) it is 
useful to provide some background here. The NETS is a longitudinal data set privately produced 
by Walls and Associates based on 19 annual snapshots of the Dun and Bradstreet (D&B) 
business-listing and credit-rating service. Because it is based on information from D&B—which 
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has a strong economic incentive to reach every business—the NETS is a near-census of business 
establishments in the United States. While the measurement of employment levels at 
establishments has been a concern of some observers, at an aggregate level, employment figures 
are consistent with trends observed in publicly available sources such as the Quarterly Census of 
Employment and Wages (QCEW) and the County Business Patterns (CBP) (Neumark et al. 
2005). The advantage of using NETS is that information is available at the establishment level on 
a wide variety of characteristics, including year of birth and death, detailed industry codes (up to 
an eight-digit SIC), sales, mobility, and branch plant status.  
We matched our incentive database to the NETS based on the company name, county, and 
approximate employment size. Of the 387 incentives, we successfully matched 270 (69.7 percent) 
to valid records in the NETS database. The primary reason some incentive records were not 
matched to the NETS is that the official company name in the D&B files differed from the company 
name listed in the media or in the North Carolina Department of Commerce report. Name 
discrepancies may arise from recent merger activity or from a name change that is unobservable. In 
other cases, company records may simply not exist in the NETS, which is a comprehensive but not 
a 100 percent complete census. What is critical for our purposes, however, is that firms that have 
gone out of business or moved outside the state are still listed in the NETS database and are 
therefore captured in our analysis. This avoids the problem of positively biasing our results by 
screening out failed firms or companies that took an incentive and then moved elsewhere. 
Ultimately our matched sample has a proportional breakdown of retention and recruitment deals 
and is similar to NETS in terms of industry sectors. Thus we interpret the matched sample of 270 
records as a representative sample of incentivized establishments in North Carolina.  
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3.2 Operationalizing Institutional Support Factors  
As indicated in Section Two, a key aspect of this paper is comparing incentive impacts 
across industry sectors that have benefited from additional state-led strategic planning initiatives. 
Specifically, we examine differential impacts of incentives in sectors identified by regional 
planning entities as targeted industries, as well as statewide mediated industry sectors. We define 
“targets” as industries that were formally recognized in target plans made by each of North 
Carolina’s seven regional economic development partnerships—the multicounty planning 
organizations designated by statute to help coordinate economic development activities across 
different regions of the state. In 2000, each regional partnership undertook a cluster identification 
and strategic targeting planning process that resulted in the identification of selected industries 
for growth encouragement within the region. We obtained the list of targeted NAICS codes and 
broke down each region’s targets by categorizing them as “existing strength targets”—industries 
that have an employment location quotient relative to the United States of greater than 1.1—or 
“aspirational” targets for industries that lacked regional concentration.  
However, the critical focus of our paper is on incentives made in those industries that 
have received significant state intervention over the past several decades. We argue that these 
industries are examples of state “mediation,” and—according to the theory presented in Section 
Two—we expect that incentive deals within these sectors will perform better than those made in 
sectors that do not simultaneously receive high levels of institutional support. We define 
mediated sectors as the life-sciences/biotechnology sector and the advanced textile 
manufacturing and nonwovens industries. Appendix A lists the NAICS codes of incentivized 
establishments that we coded as mediated for this analysis.  
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3.3 Incentive Use in North Carolina 
 Between 1996 and 2008—the period in which our media survey is based—North 
Carolina engaged in approximately 387 agreements with private companies to either stay or 
relocate within the state in exchange for state-funded incentives. The pace of incentive-granting 
increased significantly in 2000 when the JDIG program was initiated. Since 2000, an average of 
41 incentive deals have been made each year, with a peak of 75 in 2006. Overall, the average 
incentive amount offered per job was $23,849, with an average of approximately 200 announced 
jobs created or retained per incentive. As Table 1 describes, North Carolina favored recruitment 
deals by a slim margin (55 percent vs. 45 percent).  Not surprisingly, incentive amounts were 
higher, on average, for recruitment deals because there is likely more competition with other 
states and because existing North Carolina establishments face sunken costs associated with 
moving outside the state. 





Regional target Mediated industry 
Yes No Yes No 
No. of incentive deals 387 269 180 207 68 319 
       % retention 45 54 45 44 51 43 
% recruitment 55 46 55 56 49 57 
       Average incentive/job ($) 23,849 20,177 32,228 16,685 16,608 25,416 
Average jobs announced 199 182 210 189 156 208 
SOURCE: Authors’ analysis of data from a media study by the University of North Carolina’s Kenan Institute, and the North 
Carolina Department of Commerce.  
 
Examination of incentive use in regionally targeted or state-mediated industries shows 
that the share of incentives going to recruitment in these industries stays approximately the same. 
Throughout the study period there were 180 incentives (46.5 percent) made to establishments 
corresponding to regionally targeted or state-mediated industries; interestingly, the average 
incentive package offered to targeted establishments was nearly double ($32,228/job) that 
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offered to nontargeted companies ($16,685/job). This might suggest a greater willingness to pay 
on the part of state and local officials for the added strategic benefits of a targeted firm (i.e., 
positive externalities associated with clustering, import substitution, long-term growth potential, 
etc.), or it may simply reflect greater competition for firms in “rising” industries.  
For meditated industries, however, there seems to be an opposite effect on incentive 
levels. In total, 67 incentives were made in the biotechnology/life sciences and advanced textiles 
sectors. Mediated incentive deals tended to be significantly lower on a per-job basis—$8,800 
less—than those in nonmediated sectors. Although we cannot observe each negotiation process 
directly, this supports the argument made above and in Lowe (forthcoming) that, in mediated 
sectors, state actors possess deep knowledge about industry dynamics and emerging technologies 
in the field. Such knowledge can potentially help bridge the information asymmetry present in 
most incentive talks with mobile firms. In addition, we hypothesize that the process of mediation 
helps narrow the potential set of incentivized establishments to those that are a better fit for the 
region and are thus more likely to build stronger ties within the broader cluster.  
4. METHODOLOGY 
To assess the effectiveness of economic development incentives in maintaining and 
expanding employment opportunities, and to test the hypothesis that mediation matters, we 
design two empirical strategies using time-series data on employment at the establishment level. 
We split up our analysis of incentives in North Carolina based on whether they were devoted to 
firms that already existed in the state (i.e., retentions) or to attracting new establishments (i.e. 
recruitments). The primary reason for dividing up the analysis is that our panel data set is limited 
to observation of employment levels in the years before an incentive for establishments already 
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located in North Carolina. Thus the recruitment deals have no preperiod in which to conduct a 
difference-in-differences estimate of the employment impacts of an incentive. Below, we 
describe the details of our empirical strategy for measuring employment effects for retentions 
using panel data, and for recruitments using a collapsed data set and a propensity score-matching 
design to generate appropriate control groups.  
4.1 Retentions 
 Our primary empirical strategy for measuring the impact of an incentive grant on 
employment growth is to use our panel data set to generate difference-in-differences estimates by 
comparing employment levels in years before and after an establishment received a retention 
deal. The key independent variable in this approach is the timing of the incentive. Equation (1), 
below, summarizes the main specification.  In this model the incentive variable ( ) is coded 
“0” for each year (t) that the establishment (i) was located in North Carolina before receiving an 
incentive, and “1” for each year after the grant was made. Thus, our analysis only uses the 
incentive as a dichotomous (dummy) variable and does not include the dollar amount of the 
incentive, which is sometimes front-loaded and sometimes granted over time.4  The main 
outcome variable is expressed as the natural log of employment at the establishment level. 
Logging the outcome variable will smooth out the differences between employment changes at 
small and large firms and enable us to interpret the value of β1 as a semi-elasticity, the 
percentage change in employment resulting from changing the incentive status from zero to one.  
(1)  
Model 1 also includes fixed effects for each year ( ) and each establishment ( ). The inclusion 
of year fixed effects controls for any changes in employment that are due to cyclical trends 
itInctv
tγ iτ
ititit InctvEmp τγβα +++= 1ln
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correlated with time, such as macroeconomic shocks or broad growth trends that affect the entire 
state. The establishment fixed effects control for any idiosyncratic differences across 
establishments, which is essential for isolating the impact of the incentive on employment. In 
essence, the coefficient ( ) is estimated solely on variation in employment within 
establishments over time. Thus, we interpret  ( ) as a difference-in-differences (DD) estimator 
in that it is created by comparing employment changes in establishments that received an 
incentive (i.e., where the Inctv variable changes from zero to one) to those that never received an 
incentive (i.e., the control group).  
 A critical aspect of any difference-in-differences research design is to generate a 
reasonable set of controls so that we can reliably interpret the coefficient as a result of the policy 
itself, rather than as a spurious correlation generated by some form of endogeneity.  For example, 
it is reasonable to suspect that state policymakers may favor firms in rapidly growing industries 
and that an evaluation that compared incentivized firms—which may be in “sunrise” industries—
to firms in all other North Carolina industries may simply be picking up on the industry effects. 
Similarly, we would not want to include in the control group those establishments whose growth 
is largely tied to population trends, such as industries like restaurants and local retail. Thus, for 
our control group for the analysis of retention deals we use only those establishments that are in 
the set of peer three-digit Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes that ever received an 
incentive grant. Similarly, when we analyze incentive deals in either mediated industries or 
regional targets, we limit the control groups to firms in the narrower set of peer SICs that make 




4.2 Timing of Incentive Effects 
Another potential concern when analyzing employment growth in “treated” 
(incentivized) establishments is that policymakers may have some unobservable knowledge 
about the establishments that leads them to grant an incentive in the first place. This introduces 
the possibility of endogeneity between the treatment and the outcome. It is possible that 
establishments approach state officials at a critical time in their lifespan, when they are planning 
to either upgrade their plants or expand production. This would positively bias the results if those 
firms that received an incentive were already growing. Conversely, establishments that are part 
of a larger corporate structure that is retracting because of falling demand may receive an 
incentive in order to preserve employment in North Carolina and encourage the firm to make 
plant closings elsewhere. This would potentially negatively bias the results. The problem of 
pretreatment bias was first illustrated by Ashenfelter and Card (1985); they showed that a 
downward trend in earnings among job training recipients prior to training led to biased 
estimates of the value of training programs. To test for the presence of an “Ashenfelter dip,” we 
estimate a modified version of our main specification with a distributed lag structure of the 
incentive indicator variable.  
(2)    
In Equation (2), the variable  is estimated for each year from two years prior (k = t − 2) to 
the actual year incentive through a one-year lag (t + 1). We use only one year postincentive since 
our data only go through 2008 and we would be forced to drop all incentives granted in 2006.  In 
addition, we are more concerned with checking for a pretreatment bias than for the timing of 
potential growth after the incentive is made. In fact, since the one-year lag is coded “1” for all 














 As indicated above, we cannot analyze the recruitment incentives with the same panel 
regression models since we do not have any pretreatment observations on the outcome variable. 
To overcome this we adopt a different research design that simply compares the differential 
growth rate in employment between incentivized and nonincentivized establishments. We 
collapsed the panel database used for the retention analysis and calculated the net and percentage 
change in employment change over the lifespan of all establishments in North Carolina. We then 
compared the mean growth rate across the treatment and control groups and analogously broke 
out the results for regional targets and mediated sectors. 
 After collapsing the database and calculating growth rates at the establishment level, we 
needed an appropriate control group to conduct a simple difference of means test on the growth 
rates of incentivized firms and nonincentivized ones. Because year and establishment fixed 
effects cannot be used in this context, a more nuanced estimate of which establishments would 
serve as good controls was necessary. To do this we used a Mahalanobis nearest-neighbor 
matching technique that finds candidate control observations for each treated establishment 
based on its values on a set of observable covariates. Similar to propensity score matching, this 
technique uses the values of the nearest-neighbor index to weight the outcome variable of the 
controls. The specific matching criteria are the three-digit SIC Code, the start-up year, a dummy 
variable indicating whether the establishment moved from out of state, whether it was a branch 
plant or a subsidiary of a larger corporation, and the number of related establishments within the 
firm. Since we are matching on the year that the establishment appeared in the NETS, this 
effectively matches a firm that received an incentive in, say, 2003 with an establishment in a 
similar industry that also started in that year. Although these results are not directly comparable 
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with the retention analysis, they use the same difference-in-differences logic described above. 
We discuss the findings of this empirical analysis in Section Five, below.  
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 Overall, this analysis indicates that firms that received either form of state-level incentive 
experienced moderate and statistically significant positive employment growth in the years 
following the deal. However, this result may not be surprising, given that 1) the incentive dollars 
may positively influence the profitability of subsidized firms and 2) North Carolina’s historical 
cautiousness in using incentives may result in less risky use of incentives statewide. More 
importantly for the main hypothesis—that long-term state-led planning and mediation positively 
influence incentive effectiveness—we find convincing evidence that mediation does indeed 
matter for the primary outcome that economic developers attempt to influence, namely jobs. 
Below, we discuss the findings in detail for retention and recruitment deals.  
5.1 Retention Impacts 
Table 2 presents the results of the difference-in-differences regression analysis for 
retentions. Column 1 lists the impact of incentives on all retention deals made during the study 
period relative to nonincentivized establishments in the set of three-digit peer SIC codes in North 
Carolina. The point estimate (β) on the natural log of employment of 0.199 is significant at the 
0.01 level and indicates that establishments that received a retention grant grew approximately 
20 percent faster after the incentive than nonincentivized companies. In columns 2 through 5 we 
explore the impact of incentives across industries that were identified by the state’s regional 
partnerships as strategic targets.   
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Table 2 Employment Impacts for Retention Incentive Grants in North Carolina 







































              Sample restrictions              





















              















































NOTE: All models include year fixed effects and establishment fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses below 
estimate. Incentive estimate refers to the coefficient β on the incentive dummy variable. Dependent variable is the natural log of 
employment. ** significant at the 0.05 level; *** significant at the 0.01 level.  
 
Overall, deals made in industries that were regional targets performed slightly better than 
nontargeted deals (0.147 vs. 0.109). Each point estimate is significant, although the difference 
between these two estimates is not.  When we break down the targeted incentives in more detail 
we find that deals made in industries that we consider “aspirational” for the respective region—
meaning that that particular industry did not have a location quotient greater than 1.1 at the 
county level—were significantly stronger than those made in industries that were already strong 
export industries. Although we do not have a strong sense of how state and local policymakers 
are using and implementing the targeting planning process, we interpret this finding as being 
broadly supportive of the role of using incentives within a strategic process of industrial 
development. The reason why incentivized establishments in aspirational target industries 
showed significantly higher employment growth could be that state planners are successfully 
building out growth clusters in the region (i.e., they are helping grow the industries that support 
or have strong linkages with existing export sectors) or that strategic analysis allows the state to 
be more successful at reaching high-growth establishments.  Since these incentives are for 
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establishments that started in North Carolina—presumably without a direct subsidy—this result 
can also be interpreted as a focus on supporting endogenous growth in emerging industries.  
More interestingly, our findings on the impact of mediation on incentive outcomes 
(columns 6 and 7) show strong support for the arguments outlined in Section Two. Specifically, 
we find that incentives made in the mediated sectors of life sciences/biomanufacturing and 
textiles/nonwovens were associated with 28 percent faster employment growth at the 
establishment level compared to nonincentivized establishments in the same industry sectors. As 
a reminder, this is not simply a result of these sectors performing better overall, since the control 
observations come from the same set of industries. Incentives made in all other (nonmediated) 
sectors did not perform nearly as well, having a point estimate of 0.08.  We suggest that the 
process of mediation itself enables the system of actors that participate in the incentive 
negotiation process to sift through the universe of potential firms to consider a range of benefits 
they will receive from engaging with the assets of the region and the state. This includes sector-
based workforce development supports that can expedite hiring and expansion decisions, thus 
directly affecting employment outcomes. 
5.2 Robustness Check for Pretreatment Bias  
To test for the presence of a pretreatment trend in employment growth, we re-estimated 
all of our models using Equation (2). These results are presented in Table 3, below. Note that 
although each model includes two lead terms and one lag (t−2 through t+1), we only report the 
coefficient for βt+1, which is interpreted as the impact on employment for one year after the 
incentive took effect and all subsequent years. In this analysis, the overall magnitude and pattern 
of the findings remains the same, which is reassuring in terms of concerns over a pretreatment 
bias.  
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Table 3 Employment Impacts for Retention Incentive Grants in North Carolina, Distributed Lag Structure 
 
All Regional targets Mediated sectors 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
  
 













































        N  939,024 444,826 493,797 444,451 444,646 174,784 764,058 
Adj. R-squared  0.8743 0.8728 0.8645 0.8583 0.8587 0.8824 0.8546 
NOTE: All models include year fixed effects and establishment fixed effects. Robust standard errors in parentheses below 
estimate. “Incentive estimate” refers to the coefficient βt+1 on the incentive dummy variable. Regression also includes variables 
for the incentive dummy in t−2, t−1, and t. Coefficients on other lead and lag terms are not reported here for brevity’s sake. 
Dependent variable is the natural log of employment. *** significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
For all retention deals, there was a statistically significant positive impact of 0.157, or 
approximately 16 percent faster employment growth. Incentive deals made in regional targets 
and mediated sectors also outperformed nontargeted and nonmediated sectors, respectively.  
However, to examine the issue of pretrends in more detail, we plot the values of each lead and 
lag coefficient (this time with two years pre/post) for mediated and nonmediated sectors.  
As shown in Figure 1, above, the timing of the positive employment growth impact for 
incentives in mediated sectors is closely associated with the timing of the incentive deal, with 
point estimates close to zero and insignificant before the deal and positive afterwards (see Panel 
A). However, for nonmediated incentives (Panel B) the pattern appears relatively flat. We take 
this as evidence of a robust causal influence of the impact of incentives on employment growth 
for mediated sectors.   
29 
Figure 1 Time Path of Retention Incentive Impact on the Natural Log of Employment in North Carolina 
Establishments in Mediated and Nonmediated Sectors  
 
Panel A. Mediated Sectors 
 
Panel B. Nonmediated Sectors 
 
NOTE: Figures plot the coefficients for the distributed lag specification of Model 2 with two leads 
and lags of the incentive dummy variable. All models include year and establishment fixed effects. 
Coefficients are plotted in the solid line, and the 90 percent confidence interval is represented by 















































5.3 Recruitment Impacts 
 Finally, we report the findings of our analysis of recruitment deals in Table 4.  Unlike the 
panel regression models described above, the figures reported in this table are simple difference-
of-means tests comparing the net employment change over the lifetime of the establishment in 
North Carolina.  Like the retention analysis, we repeat the test for each category of incentive. 
Column 3 is the key column for interpreting the results, since it lists the difference in 
employment growth between the treatment (i.e., incentivized establishments) and controls. This 
is also referred to as the local average treatment effect (LATE) (Imbens and Angrist 1994).  The 
number of treatment cases is listed in parentheses in each row.  




(1) –  (2) 
 
 
Treatment Controls   Difference t-stat 
      
All recruitments (N = 119) 13.43 1.91 
 
11.53 2.33 
      Regional targets (N = 49) 19.92 2.47 
 
17.45 2.37 
      Nontargets (N = 69) 8.83 3.38 
 
5.45 0.83 
      Mediated sectors (N = 17) 25.00 –1.82 
 
26.82 1.81 
      Nonmediated sectors (N = 101) 11.49 3.52 
 
7.96 1.54 
    NOTE: Outcome variable is the net employment change since establishment start. Matching variables for Mahalanobis metric 
matching (3-digit SIC Code), First year, In-mover status, Relocated YN, Branch, Subsidiary, No. of related establishments in 
firm.  
 
 As described earlier, the control observations for each are selected based on a 
Mahalanobis nearest-neighbor metric matching system. This system uses the observed 
characteristics in the matching variables to choose a set of nontreated observations for each 
treatment case.  For example, for a given recruitment deal that occurred in 2002 the matching 
program will find control observations that also started in NETS in that year and had the same 
(or a very similar) three-digit SIC code and similar corporate structure characteristics. Overall, 
31 
the same general pattern of impacts is observed for recruitment deals as for retentions: the 
overall impact is positive and statistically significant.  
Specifically, establishments that received a recruitment incentive added 11.53 more jobs 
over their lifespan relative to similar establishments in the state. Note that while this figure seems 
small compared to some of the job announcements made at the time of incentive, this figure is 
the difference in net jobs created compared to the first year the establishment appears in the 
NETS data set. So if a plant opens in 2002 with 100 jobs and has 120 in 2008, the net job 
creation since start-up is 20 jobs. Regional targets seemed to be more effective at subsequent job 
creation compared to nontargeted deals. Recruitments made in mediated sectors had the largest 
differential effect compared to the control group, with a net difference of 26.8 jobs. This figure is 
significant at the 0.10 level, which is notable given the relatively small sample size of 
recruitments.  
6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
This paper has presented a detailed empirical analysis to determine the employment 
impact of state-level incentive granting in North Carolina from 1996 to 2006. It is one of the few 
studies to conduct difference-in-differences tests of the effectiveness of incentives in generating 
net new job creation. Relative to carefully selected control groups, both retention and recruitment 
deals were shown to produce positive and statistically significant employment growth. Since we 
use two distinct research designs—for retention and recruitment deals, respectively—the results 
are not directly comparable on a job-for-job basis. However, in both cases we find that incentives 
made in sectors that were either regional targets or associated with broader industry mediation 
efforts at the state level outperformed those made outside such sectors. 
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A fundamental implication of the empirical analysis offered by this paper is that planners 
cannot continue to look at the issue of incentives in a narrow, positive-or-negative way. Our 
results indicate that what drives the positive incentive impacts in North Carolina overall is not 
simply the amount offered relative to other locations, but the fact that incentives are integrated 
into a broader institutional support system epitomized by a process we call mediation.  
NOTES 
 
1. In 2008, the system was collapsed to three tiers. 
 
2. While we cannot directly estimate the universe of economic development incentives made 
exclusively by local government, we feel that we capture the majority of large incentive projects 
since 1996 in the state of North Carolina. Local governments must obtain permission for any tax 
expenditure or bond issue from the Local Government Commission (LGC). The LGC is a state 
agency that exercises fiscal oversight of local government and results in a major curtailment of 
risky development policies such as tax increment financing.  
3. The annual reports were accessed at http://www.nccommerce.com/research-
publications/incentive-reports. However, since these annual reports only contain information on 
incentives that were active in the given year, and since annual reports were not available for the 
full set of years, we use the Kenan Institute’s Media Study as the universe of incentives, and we 
confirm the information on year of incentive through the North Carolina Department of 
Commerce reports.  
4. While this approach is less nuanced than using the dollar level, given the lack of good-quality 
data on incentive dollar amounts that companies actually received, we believe it is a cleaner way 
to conduct the analysis. In addition, we are not interested in portraying the results as an elasticity 
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